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Capitalism and inequality
Boike Rehbein*
Abstract: According to the prevailing opinion, capitalism is a market economy governed by im-
mutable laws and inequality is the result of competition between free and equal individuals on 
that market. This paper argues that capitalism, as developed in Western Europe in modern times, 
has more in common with organized crime than with a system of natural laws. It is rooted in 
the sale of church and common lands, the privatization of finance (especially public debt) and 
colonialism. However, its purpose is not the accumulation of wealth. It is merely a particular way 
of sustaining domination by a small group of people over the rest of the population. Domina-
tion in capitalism differs from earlier forms of domination in two ways: it is reproduced via the 
accumulation of wealth and it is not visible as such. Neither the purpose (domination) nor the 
functioning (systematic appropriation) is visible on the surface. Even Marx was led to believe 
that the economy is governed by laws which can be studied scientifically. The paper will argue 
against this belief by tracing the structures of domination to the reproduction of social inequality 
in capitalist societies.
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Capitalismo e desigualdade
Resumo: De acordo com a opinião predominante, o capitalismo é uma economia de mercado 
regida por leis imutáveis e a desigualdade é o resultado da competição entre indivíduos livres e 
iguais nesse mercado. Este artigo argumenta que o capitalismo, conforme desenvolvido na Euro-
pa Ocidental nos tempos modernos, tem mais em comum com o crime organizado do que com um 
sistema de leis naturais. Está enraizado na venda de igrejas e terras comunitárias, na privatização 
das finanças (especialmente da dívida pública) e no colonialismo. No entanto, seu objetivo não é o 
acúmulo de riqueza. Esta é apenas uma forma particular de sustentar a dominação de um peque-
no grupo de pessoas sobre o resto da população. A dominação no capitalismo difere das formas 
anteriores de dominação de duas maneiras: é reproduzida por meio da acumulação de riqueza e 
não é visível como tal. Nem a finalidade (dominação) nem o funcionamento (apropriação sistemá-
tica) são visíveis na superfície. Até Marx foi levado a acreditar que a economia é governada por 
leis que podem ser estudadas cientificamente. O artigo argumentará contra essa crença ao traçar 
as estruturas de dominação até a reprodução da desigualdade social nas sociedades capitalistas. 
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Introduction
Every year, a new world-historical record in socio-economic inequality is pro-claimed. In 2018, the 26 richest men owned as much wealth as the poorer half of the world population (almost four billion people) combined (The Guardian, 
20 January 2019). Everybody knows this level of inequality is unsustainable, every 
capitalist state is worried about it, and a lot of measures are taken against it – but 
it keeps getting worse (Stiglitz, 2012: 20-25). This is partly because we understand 
neither capitalism nor inequality. And we do not understand them partly because 
we believe in the ideology that has been created around capitalism since the devel-
opment of its modern, Western form (cf. Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999).
According to this ideology, capitalism developed in Europe until it became so efficient 
that it spread across the world. This is not true. European capitalism developed in 
conjunction with colonialism and spread across the world due to colonialism. Accord-
ing to ideology, capitalism is a market economy that is governed by natural laws. This 
is not true. Capitalism is almost the opposite of a market, it is the monopolization of 
capital in the hands of few, which has nothing to do with natural laws. According to 
ideology, the core of capitalism consists in the utilization of wage labor. This is not 
true. Wage labor played a key role only during industrialization, otherwise capitalism 
seeks to exploit anything and everything. According to ideology, the division of pro-
ductive labor is the driving force of capitalism and the domination of finance is an 
aberration. This is untrue. Finance has been the motor of capitalism.
The ideological view of capitalism combines with the invisibility of structural domi-
nation to construct an entirely misguided understanding of inequality. According to 
the conventional view, capitalism created a complete break with the past: Suddenly, 
all individuals were free and equal. The core of capitalist society was supposed to 
be competition on a level playing field for wealth. It is difficult to construct a myth 
that is further from the truth. The precapitalist inequalities were not abolished by 
capitalism and not even by the advent of democracy. And competition in capitalist 
societies is not about money. It is about capital but only a tiny group monopolizes 
capital and actually competes for it. The rest competes for means of consump-
tion. However, capital is only a means for domination. Inequality, in reality, is about 
domination. Since the structures of domination are rendered invisible in capitalist 
societies, very little can be done about inequality.
In this paper, I will elaborate briefly on each point listed in the two preceding para-
graphs. I try to show that capitalism is tied to colonialism, has nothing to do with a 
market or natural laws, consists in the exploitation of anything and is driven by fi-
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nance capital. And I will argue that inequalities in capitalist societies are merely trans-
formations of precapitalist hierarchies, are mediated by the monopolistic ownership 
of capital and are rooted in domination. A final section will deal with the hierarchy of 
social classes in capitalist nation states and their relation on a global scale.
Definitions
A meaningful definition of capitalism would have to distinguish between its differ-
ent forms and to address at least some of the issues mentioned in the introduction. 
Therefore, it can only be the result of a study, not its beginning. However, I would 
like to start with a working definition to make my line of argument as transparent as 
possible. I think it is acceptable to begin with Max Weber’s (1986: 12-14) definition 
of a “capitalist action” as an investment with the expectation of a profit. It is import-
ant to note that capital is an investment. There are other forms of wealth (such as 
money, real estate or a car) but they are not capital unless they are invested. And 
there are other forms of making a profit, such as begging or stealing, but they are 
not capitalist unless they flow from an investment of capital.
A capitalist is a human being that owns capital as a property before engaging in a 
capitalist action. Capital is not the result of capitalism but a precondition. And it 
cannot be common property; capital and profit are private property, from which 
other people are excluded. The individual capitalist invests in order to replace the 
original capital and to generate a surplus, which is the profit. The capital itself does 
not diminish, it is not spent but always replaced. The capitalist lives off the profit. 
Whoever spends his or her capital on consumption is not a capitalist. The ideal type 
of a capitalist action consists in acquiring something with a certain invested amount 
of capital and selling it at a higher price. This something can be someone’s labor 
power but it could also be anything else.
With Weber, we have to understand capitalism as a contextual phenomenon. It 
does not have one universal shape but comes in various configurations depending 
on the historical circumstances. Weber (1986: 14) argued that capitalism has exist-
ed in many places and times. Particular about modern Western capitalism is that 
it penetrates all spheres of life, so that we can speak of a capitalist society and not 
just of a capitalist economy. Everywhere else, it has always been limited to a small 
group of traders or capitalists. Capitalists were a caste or rank or community, often 
of subordinate status. Today, capitalism penetrates all spheres of society and inte-
grates more or less every member of society (Polanyi, 1944). This was the result of 
the development of European capitalism. Therefore, I will limit my argument to this 
type of capitalism, namely institutionalized Western capitalism.
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Inequality is usually studied in quantitative and economic terms. These generally 
refer to income and, less frequently, to profession or wealth. This approach is mis-
leading. It reduces the issue of inequality to one dimension, which is not even the 
most relevant one. Inequality is about domination, not about money or careers. We 
are made believe that we compete for a better job or more money. The cards for this 
competition, however, are dealt before it even begins. And the competition mainly 
takes place within the peer-group or the framework of a social class. Ideology tells 
us that the best in this competition win and that wealth or success is due to individ-
ual merit. Thereby, it renders the conditions and structures of competition invisible.
This paper deals with social inequality, which is not only determined by the dis-
tribution of economic goods and professions but also by the distribution of other 
forms of resources and habitus (Bourdieu, 1984) as well as by the historical devel-
opment of society. Social inequality signifies the differential access to activities, po-
sitions and goods that are valued in society – or the structure of privileges. In a later 
section, I will try to show that the distribution of resources is not so much a result 
of competition but a heritage that is reproduced from one generation to the next. 
In capitalist societies, this legacy is passed on within boundaries of social classes. I 
define social class as a tradition line which reproduces itself from one generation to 
the next by passing on relevant resources and habitus traits to the next generation 
as well as by symbolically distinguishing itself from other classes. This concept of 
social class can be operationalized by establishing the relative limits of social mo-
bility. Social mobility takes place within the boundaries of a social class but rarely 
crosses them. A tradition line is a common class culture, which is based mainly on 
habitus (Thompson, 1963).
The hierarchy of social classes is rooted in and conditioned by precapitalist hierar-
chies. These partly persist for generations after the emergence of capitalism next 
to the social classes. I refer to these precapitalist hierarchies as sociocultures. The 
structure of inequality in any capitalist nation state can be explained as a transfor-
mation and persistence of sociocultures in combination with political interventions, 
crises and the position in the world system.
Colonialism
The first assumption we have to refute postulates that capitalism emerged within 
Europe due to its superior organization and productivity of the economy. Adam 
Smith and Karl Marx agree that science, technology, the division of labor and 
the free market were responsible for the success of capitalism in Europe before 
it spread across the world. These factors were important indeed – but only after 
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capitalism had spread across the world. The steam engine, gun powder and metal 
factories with a thousand workers existed in China long before any European even 
dreamt of them (Jones, 1988: 15, 74).
Colonialism was the driving force of European capitalism before industry and tech-
nology began to matter. Colonialism was rooted in the crusades and played a crucial 
role in the expansion of the North Italian city states after 1000 CE. Venice was the 
main mediator of trade between Asia and Europe between 1204 and 1453, but it 
was also involved in the crusades and practiced colonialism by occupying territories 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, where slaves and indented laborers produced agri-
cultural and manufactured goods for the Venetian population, especially the elites. 
In 1453, the Ottomans conquered Constantinople, which had been a Venetian colo-
ny since 1204. Europe no longer dominated the Eastern Mediterranean and the link 
to the Arab trade network was severed. Genova and Portugal explored alternative 
trade routes and in 1492, Columbus landed in America. Portugal and Spain began to 
dominate Europe’s long-distance trade, which they financed with precious metals 
from America (Frank, 1998).
Other European states contested Spain’s position and robbery was the main prin-
ciple of European “trade” during that period. Spaniards robbed gold and silver in 
America, Spaniards, Portuguese and Dutch robbed goods along the Asian coast or 
traded the precious metals for them, Dutch robbed Spanish and Portuguese ships 
sailing back to Europe (Panikkar, 1955: 51-57). Increasingly, the English pirates were 
most successful and with the defeat of the Spanish military fleet, the Armada, in 
1588, England became the dominant European trading power.
Piracy was supported by the English crown but more important for the develop-
ment of capitalism was the foundation of colonial companies in Northwestern 
Europe. The colonial companies were shareholder societies, actual corporations, 
founded by nobility, monarchs, representatives of the state and traders. They re-
ceived monopolies for particular world regions and were supported by the state 
(Bairoch, 1993: 89). Rich individuals contributed to funding expeditions by investing 
money with the expectation of significant returns – they acted as capitalists. The 
English crown sold shares of the colonial companies and thereby generated a profit. 
The shareholders made a profit when the expeditions were successful. Profits could 
be astronomical – in the seventeenth century, clove averaged a profit rate of 2500 
per cent (Panikkar, 1955: 96).
This was the birth of modern capitalism. Capital was not accumulated via produc-
tion but via piracy, robbery of raw materials, metals and goods, slavery and be trayal. 
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This happened as an investment by capital owners, legitimized and supported by 
the state (Braudel, 1985: 60). While Venice focused on trade, Spain and England 
focused on exploitation. And whereas Spain practiced exploitation mainly for the 
sake of the monarch, England practiced exploitation for the sake of the capital own-
ers (including the monarch). England was the main force in the development of 
capitalism – however, not through nineteenth century industrialization but through 
seventeenth century colonialism.
Colonialism resulted from the concerted action of the dominant ranks of feudal so-
ciety, the rulers of the nascent nation state and capitalists. These groups merged to 
become the dominant class of capitalist society. In the course of this development, 
colonialism transformed into imperialism. The colonies were no longer exploited 
by private companies but administered by organs of European nation states, who, 
in 1914, ruled over 85 percent of the surface of the earth (Nederveen Pieterse, 
1989: 179). Profits were increasingly used to develop European manufacturing into 
large-scale industries. Colonies were converted into plantations, suppliers of raw 
materials and markets for European manufactured goods (Osterhammel, 1995: 36). 
Industries that already existed in the colonies were destroyed and the develop-
ment of new industries was prohibited (Nederveen Pieterse, 1989: 115). The most 
famous example for this is the praised Indian textile industry, which was thereby 
replaced by the nascent British textile industry (Bose & Jalal, 1998: 56).
The most important consequence of colonialism was the creation of an integrated 
unequal world order. In the process, up to 262 million people were killed in the col-
onies, Europe was industrialized, precapitalist states were transformed into nation 
states, racism became an overarching ideology and close links between capital, trade 
and the state apparatus were formed. These consequences persist, even though 
Europe no longer dominates the world. All of the poor countries today are former 
colonies, while the former colonial rulers belong to the group of rich countries. Only 
a few of the former colonies managed to rise to the status of a rich country. Colonial-
ism forms the most relevant socioculture of the contemporary world and explains 
many of its inequalities on a global scale. I will return to this point further down.
Trade and finance
Colonialism was closely linked to finance and trade. While in Venice trade between 
Asia and Europe was the focus, robbery formed the nucleus of English colonialism. 
Both were capitalist activities – which, following Weber, consists in the investment 
of capital with the expectation of a profit. Trade is usually financed by capitalists, 
often on the basis of a credit extended by a financial institution to a trader. This was 
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the usual pattern in Venice of 1200 just as in England of 1600. The main agents of 
long-distance trade and colonialism were corporations that were financed by banks 
and controlled by aristocracies.
This capitalist business was based on an important (re-)invention, namely the bill of 
exchange, around 1200 (Braudel, 1979). The bill of exchange is a piece of paper, for 
which a debtor receives money and by which he promises to pay back the equiva-
lent sum at a later point in time. Usually, the creditor receives an interest payment in 
addition to this sum. In the sixteenth century, the bill of exchange was developed to 
the degree that it could be sold on to a third party along with the right to payment 
plus interest – which is the root of the bank note as well as of the government bond.
In the end, the creditor receives his investment and a profit, while the debtor pays 
the original sum and an interest rate. The debtor loses money, unless he uses the 
credit to invest in a business that generates a higher profit than the interest rate. 
This is the goal that capitalist trade pursues. Capitalist traders usually need a credit 
in order to buy goods, which they later sell at a higher price. This has nothing to 
do with private credit or mortgage, where a consumer spends the entire borrowed 
sum on goods of consumption, which he or she uses, and has to generate an in-
come by labor in order to pay back the credit plus interest. The trader, in contrast, 
buys in order to sell at a higher price.
While European long-distance trade was increasingly conducted by colonial corpora-
tions, finance was increasingly in the hands of banks. The princes and noblemen in 
the Italian city-states were often bankers at the same time, especially after the thir-
teenth century. Probably the most famous example is the Medici family that domi-
nated Florence from around 1400, owned the largest bank of the city and had several 
popes in the sixteenth century. Finance was the most important business in Northern 
Italy of the Renaissance. It was closely linked to trade but not so much to production.
Marxists and classical economists usually argue that money is only a symbol for 
“real” values, especially manufactured goods. This is misleading. Finance capital is 
a means of power. It can be a value in itself, it does not have to represent anything 
else. In addition, it is backed by the state, which is the owner of its entire territory, 
its infrastructure and, to some degree, its population. The state backs the capital-
ist’s claim to power by guaranteeing the “value” of a piece of paper. The power 
consists in the right to use labor, nature, resources and capital itself. Financial cap-
ital has been an essential component of capitalism, no matter whether you date 
its beginning to the thirteenth century in Italy, the sixteenth century in Western 
Europe or the eighteenth century in Britain.
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Expropriation
There are reasons to date the beginnings of modern Western capitalism, which I 
will refer to as institutionalized capitalism, to Britain in the seventeenth century. 
Three developments were significant to construct capitalism as an institution that 
comprises all sectors of society. Firstly, the population was disowned. Secondly, the 
United Kingdom was transformed into a nation state. Thirdly, national debt was 
privatized by a national bank. In connection with colonialism, finance capital and 
the exploitation of resources that were already present in Italy, these are the most 
important historical determinants of institutionalized capitalism.
The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 shifted European trade routes 
from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. England achieved a dominant status in the 
Atlantic after destroying the Spanish Armada in 1588. At this time, England had 
achieved a level of capital concentration that was unknown elsewhere. Its roots 
lay in the wish of King Henry VIII to divorce from his wife, which was not possible 
under the statutes of the Catholic Church. In order to legalize divorce, he declared 
the Anglican Church to be independent of the Catholic Church. Thereby, he took 
control of the Church’s possessions. He sold much of the real estate and gave some 
land to his entourage (Tawney, 1966).
Only few people in England had the means to buy land, which resulted in an extreme 
concentration of real estate. This was used for commercial agricultural production 
leading to an increase in wealth concentration. This development continued, as 
buyouts characterized the seventeenth century and the conversion of community 
land into private property happened in the eighteenth century (Gray 1998). Noble 
families, including the royal household, continue to hold much of the real estate in 
Great Britain to this day (Irvin, 2008: 13).
The privatization of real estate entailed that people could no longer practice subsis-
tence farming but had to seek employment and to buy their means of subsistence. 
However, there was no work beyond feudal serfdom in the sixteenth century. Pau-
perization and emigration were the consequences, epitomized by the arrival of the 
Mayflower in North America in 1620. The flow of people into the colonies contin-
ued over the centuries and only stopped after the end of industrialization. Industry 
itself could not absorb all the rural-urban migrants, not even in its heyday of the 
nineteenth century.
Expropriation forces everyone who has no capital to seek wage-labor. In all other 
forms of society, it was, in principle, possible to seek a piece of land and live off 
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its produce. This might have been practically impossible for slaves and servants 
but whoever managed to leave patrimonial relationships was able to find plenty of 
unoccupied land without owner. Today, this option no longer exists. Basically the 
entire surface of the planet is private property. All of us, who own no capital in the 
strict sense, are (potential) laborers and consumers.
The nation state
Until the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648, European states were entities owned 
and run by monarchs and princes. The entire state apparatus of Queen Elizabeth 
comprised a few hundred persons and was more or less identical with the court 
(Suerbaum, 1989: 132). The monarch ruled over a population and exploited it to 
his or her own benefit. After the Thirty Years’ War, much of Europe was divided into 
territories and rule became increasingly impersonal, legalized and bureaucratic. 
The feudal state was slowly transformed into a nation state.
The nation state differs from the feudal state in several regards. First, it is no longer 
a private matter of the ruler but the ruler represents the population. Second, the 
nation state has a legal framework. Third, it has a territorial border. Fourth, the 
population is increasingly interpreted in a nationalistic way – with a supposedly 
uniform history, culture and language. In reality, there were no such states at the 
end of the Thirty Years’ War. It took centuries to complete this transformation. The 
United Kingdom achieved it toward the end of the seventeenth century, some for-
mer colonies only toward the end of the twentieth century. It entailed integration, 
pacification and control of the population on the inside and protection against the 
outside (Foucault, 1977). It also created a uniform national market on the inside 
and pursuit of profits on the outside.
The English nation state emerged out of a long civil war. In the end, nobility, roy-
al household and new capitalists reached a compromise, which characterizes the 
state to this day. These three groups monopolize wealth and have monopolized 
political power until quite recently (and continue to do so to a significant degree, 
since monarch and House of Lords still yield a lot of power and the rich dominate 
the lower house). The three groups had already been cooperating in the colonial 
enterprise for a century and the nation state continued to be largely a colonial en-
terprise well into the twentieth century.
Institutionalized capitalism was a global project from the start. Trade in Venice and 
Genova as well as Portugal and Spain had a global horizon. But England (viz. the 
United Kingdom and Great Britain) became a nation state, which integrated the 
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entire population into the project of capitalism and global expansion instead of 
limiting it to a few companies. All of these states were in a permanent state of war 
around the world as long as they aimed at capitalist expansion abroad.
Sovereign debt
In order to understand the capitalist configuration in the European nation state as 
opposed to earlier states, we have to turn to the specific relation between capital 
and state. In the Italian states, there was a close connection between ruler and 
finance. Portugal and Spain financed their expansion via exploitation of the colo-
nies – by and for the sake of the monarchs. England developed a system of credit 
finance, in which capitalists invest in sovereign debt in order to make a profit. This 
entails a certain degree of leverage by the creditors over the state. Finance capital 
controls trade via credit and the state via sovereign debt (Henwood, 1998: 22). The 
distinguishing characteristic of sovereign debt is that it is rarely paid back but caus-
es a constant flow of interest payment – by the state to the capitalists.
Because of the European wars, colonialism and the civil war, the English monarch 
accumulated an enormous level of debt in the seventeenth century. In 1694, after 
the end of the civil war, the Bank of England was created as a corporation. The 
bank converted the debt of the state into government bonds and sold them. The 
receipts were “Bank of England Notes”, the first banknotes. The owners of these 
banknotes received interest payments over a fixed period of time. After this, the 
state was supposed to purchase them at their nominal value. Thereby, the owner 
made a profit, which could amount to double of the original investment. However, 
the state rarely repaid its debt but rather financed the purchase of the government 
bond with another bond which entailed more flow of interest to the owners of 
capital.
In the eighteenth century, sovereign debt became the foundation of finance capi-
tal (Phillips, 2002: 214). The Rothschilds, very likely the world’s richest family up to 
this day, are probably the most famous example for the power and significance of 
sovereign debt in Europe. But the development in the USA may be more relevant. 
Many of the richest families of the US became wealthy on the basis of sovereign 
debt, which was organized by influential politicians of British origin, such as Robert 
Morris, Alexander Hamilton and William Duer (Phillips, 2002: 214).
Most important is the power that the ownership of sovereign debt entails. While 
the feudal monarch may have been indebted, he or she was still the supreme ruler. 
The Italian prince was dependent on finance, but he was often a banker himself. 
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The nation state, however, becomes an entity that has no autonomy from financial 
capital, as long as it is indebted. The worst thing that could happen from the per-
spective of capital is that a state repays its entire debt. The best thing is repayment 
by means of new government bonds – and this is what usually happens. Basically 
all nation states today are heavily indebted. Thereby, they are entirely dependent 
on finance capital and constantly move money to it. I will return to this further 
down.
Sovereign debt continues to be highly significant. It constitutes a continuous flow of 
interest to the owners of capital. Interest is paid by the state, which means largely 
by tax payers. The state would have the power to simply print the money it needs 
or to erase its debt. After wars and revolutions, this has been suggested and some-
times carried out. But usually, members of government thwart this option, since 
they either own government bonds themselves or act in the name of capital own-
ers. Alexander Hamilton is a good case in point (Phillips, 2002: 16).
Technology and industry
The colonialist nation state spread capitalism across the world. However, feudal 
conditions continued to persist in many European societies, while subsistence 
farming and patrimonialism prevailed in many colonies, especially in Asia. Much of 
the world population lived outside of capitalist structures, even in England. Capital-
ists made profits through exploitation of resources, slavery, trade and finance. Only 
industrialization created a demand for labor. Since free laborers were cheaper than 
slaves in the long run, as they carry all risks, take care of their subsistence and can 
be easily replaced, slavery gave way to wage-labor.
Schoolbooks like to link capitalism and industrialization. The industrial revolution, 
however, only began in the eighteenth century, especially with the invention of the 
cotton gin in the 1760s and the (re-)invention of the steam engine in 1784. Euro-
pean industry did not play a major economic role before the nineteenth century. In 
1820, Asia still had a share of 59 percent in global production, more than Europe, 
the US and the rest of the world combined (Polanyi Levitt, 2013: 158). Until this 
time, production in Europe was mainly organized in guilds. Technological innovation 
was important but economic growth resulted mostly from an increase in labor use 
(Pomeranz, 2000: 91).
The key development of industrialization was the scientifically planned mass pro-
duction, which first emerged in Great Britain after the late eighteenth century. In 
this period, the classical works of economics were written by Adam Smith, David Ri-
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cardo and Karl Marx. They considered industry to be the core of capitalism and nat-
ural science the means to understand and administer it. However, industry formed 
the core of capitalism for not even two centuries. Today, industrial production con-
tributes not even twenty percent to the GDP of the US – less than in Nepal. This also 
means that the exploitation of wage-labor is merely one aspect of capitalism. And 
science plays an inferior role in most other aspects of capitalism.
Industry requires large-scale investments and large markets. Both were partly deliv-
ered by the British colonies. Invested capital was generated by the colonial profits, 
proceeds from real estate and financial speculation. The manufactured goods were 
sold partly in the colonies. As is well known, the textile industry was the pioneer of 
British industrialization. India’s textile production was superior to the British but it 
was prohibited by the colonial administration (Panikkar, 1955: 51). On this basis, all 
Indians had to buy textiles manufactured by British textile factories. India continues 
to suffer from this destruction of its industrial base and its traditions.
Industrial production was the core of capitalism only while profit rates were higher 
than in other spheres of the economy. This was the case only under colonial con-
ditions. The colonial powers were able to import their raw materials at a very low 
cost from the colonies, process them in their factories and sell the products at high 
prices. With the end of colonialism and the shift of production to low-cost coun-
tries, profitability of the industrial sector decreased in Western countries. Capital 
returned to trade and finance.
The profitability of industrial production is based on the (almost) free acquisition 
of raw materials – from water and oil to timber and precious metals. The produc-
tivity of scientific manufacturing contributes far less to capitalist profits than the 
exploitation of nature. All societies live off nature but only capitalism developed 
the ability to destroy the planet. Adam Smith already described the systematic de-
struction of nature for the sake of capitalist profit in 1776 (Smith, 2007: 105-113).
Industrial production is unthinkable without the exploitation of nature. At the same 
time, most means of subsistence – water, shelter, food – are accessible today only 
via the capitalist system. Only (polluted) air is still free. The exploitation of nature 
in capitalism is systematic (Moore, 2015). Whereas earlier societies left significant 
parts of nature untouched, capitalism transforms an increasing number of things 
into goods in order to generate a profit. We all know that this process is about to 
destroy the foundations of life. It is important to note that it is not a component of 
“human nature”. Kleenex does not clearcut old forests nor does Shell drill for oil in 
order for humanity to survive. They do this in order to make a profit.
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Capital and market
Textbooks tell us that the economy in a capitalist society is organized as a market 
and comprises all productive activities. However, the majority of productive and 
necessary activities takes place outside the “market”. We help our neighbor build a 
shed, a friend move to a new place, our daughter with her homework and the aunt 
organize a party. These activities are productive and could be measured in money. 
In addition, we have to consider reproductive activities, such as child-rearing and 
housework. All of these activities combined probably comprise the majority of eco-
nomic activity – but they are not organized as a “market”. I would call this the social 
economy.
The term “market”, however, is misleading as well. The baker next door may use 
flour of bad quality and charge excessive prices but he only uses his income to 
pay for his own livelihood. With your shopping you basically pay for his shopping – 
and both of you consume the acquired goods to stay alive. You could go shopping 
elsewhere. If the baker’s products are too expensive or too terrible, you probably 
would. This is a market. Several suppliers compete via quality and price for custom-
ers. If the market is organized by the state on a national level, we may speak of a 
market economy.
Capitalism has nothing to do with the market, which Fernand Braudel has shown 
convincingly (Braudel, 1985). Capitalism is not about competition among equals 
who try to secure their livelihoods but about profit and accumulation. Only a sec-
tion of the economy is organized as capitalism. This section first comprised finance 
and trade and was then extended to the exploitation of European colonies and 
finally penetrated the entire society, both in Europe and in the colonies. The ap-
paratus of the nation state mainly served the purpose of organizing and protecting 
this sphere of the economy. The market in the strict sense, as introduced in the 
preceding paragraph, does not require any organization, since demand and supply 
regulate everything via quality and price.
The capitalist “market”, in contrast, is organized in such a way that capitalists’ prof-
its are secured. The capitalist section of the economy has always consisted of oli-
gopolies or even monopolies. Corporations of the past, such as the colonial com-
panies or the American railway trusts, had state-backed monopolies, at least for 
a certain region. If any competition emerged, it was done away with by mergers 
or destruction of the competitor. Today, any sector of the capitalist economy is 
dominated by a few corporations – which tend to own each other. The appearance 
of competition is maintained by anti-trust legislation and the existence of several 
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brands but in reality, all corporations are owned by the same group of capitalists. I 
will expand on this further down.
The different segments of the economy – social economy, market, market economy 
and capitalism – do not exist independently of each other but capitalism seeks to 
incorporate those fields that could generate a profit. It thereby changes the other 
segments. At the same time, elements of the market and the social economy persist 
within capitalism. For example, any person who is active in the field of capitalism 
also makes presents or exchanges goods and services. Without these activities, cap-
italism could not function. If the entire economy were geared only to profit-making, 
the majority of vital activities – from birth and education to friendship and public 
services – would disappear. Capitalism can be interpreted as a parasite that lives off 
a host, which is society, including the social economy.
Textbooks claim to describe capitalism but actually talk about the market. In the 
public language of marketing, politics and media, there is no difference between 
the baker next door and Rockefeller. Liberal economists from Adam Smith to Milton 
Friedman always illustrate the functioning of capitalism with regard to an exchange 
between two Robinson Crusoes or at best a farmers’ market. These have nothing 
to do with capitalism. Such representations are intentionally misleading in order to 
legitimize capitalism.
Political legitimation
As a consequence of the Thirty Years’ War and the civil war, the United Kingdom 
installed a parliament. However, only a small fraction of the population was rep-
resented in it, namely the nobility in the upper house and the bourgeoisie in the 
lower house. Well into the twentieth century, government and leading bureaucrats 
were recruited only from these two groups. It was a democracy of capital owners 
(Polanyi Levitt, 2013: 147). This changed only with the social reforms by the Labour 
Party after the Second World War.
Textbooks tell us that the French and American revolutions made democracy a re-
ality and that the West became democratic. However, many European states wit-
nessed democratic revolutions only in the twentieth century or not at all. And until 
the twentieth century, the majority of the population was excluded from democ-
racy, even in France and the US. Slaves and workers gained citizen rights in the late 
nineteenth century, women and people from the colonies in the twentieth. Some 
groups, such as foreigners and convicts, are denied citizen rights up to this day in 
many countries. Democracy was introduced step by step over centuries. The for-
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merly underprivileged groups remain underprivileged because their lack of means 
and respect was never compensated for.
Today, most nation states call themselves democracies: Great Britain with a mon-
arch and an aristocracy privileged by the constitution, Sweden with a strong social 
system and a monarch (and the highest wealth inequality in the world), Switzerland 
with elements of a direct democracy and China with a communist one-party rule. 
None of these countries has made equality a reality. They differ significantly from 
one another but they have in common that capitalists are privileged. The differenc-
es result from history and political struggles. Some countries have abolished many 
privileges of the nobility and some have even limited the privileges of capital. The 
structures of domination, however, with a tiny privileged group dominating the rest 
of society persist everywhere.
The degree of inequality in capitalist societies is evident to any observer. At the 
same time, democracy proclaims the ideal of equality. In any democracy, there is a 
tension between the concentration of capital and the ideal of equality. It plays out 
as a conflict between state and economy (or “market”). In principle, the population 
has the option to change the status quo and to achieve more equality via the state. 
Capitalists try to prevent this and have many powers to do so but the possibility of 
creating more equality exists and is sometimes realized.
That this rarely happens is partly due to the symbolic universe of capitalism and 
the way inequality is legitimized. Inequality in capitalism is supposed to be the 
result of competition between free and equal individuals – in contrast to other 
forms of organized states, which were openly unequal. The meritocratic myth was 
shaped by mainstream social science since the seventeenth century, especially 
by liberal traditions. Even though it clearly contradicts everything we experience 
every day, all of us believe at least to some degree in the meritocratic myth: we 
are all equal, all opportunities are open to everyone of us, inequality results from 
competition on a level playing field, and whoever lives in misery has to take at least 
some of the blame.
Liberalism and the meritocratic myth can be traced back to Thomas Hobbes who 
published his main work, Leviathan (Hobbes, 1986), in the midst of the English civil 
war in 1651. Hobbes applied Galileo’s mechanics to society and interpreted human 
beings as identical atoms. Just like Galileo explained the physical world on the ba-
sis of one single defining characteristic of the atom, namely movement, Hobbes 
explained the social world on the basis of the defining characteristic of the human, 
namely survival or self-interest. Since self-interested beings would kill each other 
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in an endless competition, Hobbes called for a regulating force: each individual 
transfers some of its powers to the sovereign (or state) that limits self-interested 
action and guarantees a peaceful competition. Hobbes suggested that a monarch 
be the best incorporation of the sovereign but a century later, Rousseau replaced 
the monarch by the idea of a democracy, which was then partly realized by the 
American and French revolutions.
Adam Smith’s economics is basically an application of Hobbes’ socio-political science 
to the economy. In the Wealth of Nations, published in the same year as the Ameri-
can Declaration of Independence (1776), Smith explains that the market guarantees 
a maximum of productivity, quality and price efficiency, if it is an unfettered compe-
tition between legally free and equal individuals (Smith, 2007). The same should be 
true for the world market of nation states. Nations and individuals should pursue their 
self-interest and, in the course, specialize on what they do best. Thereby, they would 
acquire relative advantages. Smith suggests a similar role for the state as Hobbes: to 
regulate markets in such a way that a free and equal competition is possible.
Just like Hobbes, Smith ignores the inequalities between individuals (and nations) 
before any competition. He takes for granted that there are capitalists and labor-
ers and that capitalists should get the profits and laborers a wage to secure their 
subsistence (Smith, 2007: 7). He has no problem admitting that there are classes 
in society and that people are born into and die in their class. Since the advent of 
democracy, this is no longer acknowledged. Everyone is supposed to be equal – in 
spite of the existence of slavery, exclusion of women and no voting rights for the 
poor. Today, with full suffrage for (almost) everyone and full economic rights for all, 
this seems to be a problem of the past.
Emergence of classes
Inequality is not a result of competition, it is a starting condition. All the inequal-
ities mentioned in the previous paragraph persist because they have never been 
compensated for. Women were given the right to vote – but at that point, men had 
already captured all leading positions in society and all capital. Slaves were freed 
– but they had no education, no money, no connections, no respect, no access to 
jobs and markets. The poor were given the right to participate in the market – but 
they had no capital. The formerly excluded groups were able to achieve minimum 
rights through long struggles but they never received even a small fraction of the 
privileges of the formerly included groups. They were integrated as subalterns into 
the “democracy”. This is the basis of our invisible inequality.
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Until the twentieth century, no democracy included the entirety of its population, 
not even its majority. And there was never a complete break with the past. Monar-
chy and nobility were never entirely abolished. In fact, many nation states around 
the world still have a monarch and many a nobility, including Great Britain, where 
the royal household, nobility and capitalists formed a new dominant class after 
the civil war. This happened in most European and American as well as in some 
African states. The old ruling groups merged with the new capitalists and excluded 
more or less all others from the new “democratic” state. In many Asian and Afri-
can states, a more inclusive democracy was installed right with independence but 
earlier hierarchies were not done away with either. The old dominant groups and 
elites remained on top.
Three general types of states resulted from the transition to capitalist democracy 
(Jodhka et alii, 2017: 14). The nation states with a long capitalist and democrat-
ic past in Europe have established stable class structures. Neither the precapital-
ist structures nor contemporary class structures are openly visible any more. In 
contrast, the slave-holding settler colonies of America experienced independence 
around two centuries ago but the former slaves received full citizenship only in the 
twentieth century. The legacy of slavery is still openly visible. This is partly true for 
the relation between settlers and indigenous populations in Oceania and Southern 
Africa as well. The third type includes most nation states of Africa and Asia, which 
received their territorial borders and independence only a few decades ago. Pre-
capitalist structures and inequalities remain clearly visible.
Some nation states do not fit any of the types, since they were never fully integrat-
ed into the colonial system, such as China, Ethiopia and Thailand, or since they have 
a peculiar history. But inequality in all contemporary nation states is only intelligi-
ble as a transformation of precapitalist hierarchies – or sociocultures. The formerly 
underprivileged groups remain underprivileged and the formerly dominant groups 
mostly retain their dominant position. In capitalist society, these hierarchies slowly 
develop into social classes.
Economic classes
Marx’ division of society into capitalists and laborers is a gross simplification of 
the diversity of social structures that exist around the world. Each nation state has 
its particular inequalities that are transformations of precapitalist hierarchies and 
therefore a unique structure of social classes. However, Marx is entirely correct 
when speaking about economic classes. Only a tiny group of people, around 0.05 
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percent of the world population, owns capital in Weber’s sense: wealth that is in-
vested with the expectation of a profit. The rest has to labor and depends entirely 
on the capitalists. Marx (1985: 523) explained that the laborer only has a life if he 
(or she) finds a capital that employs him (or her). In an economic sense, capitalist 
society consists only of capital and labor.
In order to fully understand this, we have to clearly define capital. Capital is not 
wealth or property or income or money. Only an investment with the expectation 
of a profit is capital. Any income can be used for consumption or saved. If it is con-
sumed, it is gone. If it is saved, it can be used for future consumption. When money 
is saved and invested with the expectation of a profit, it can become capital. Whoever 
owns a few company shares or a life-insurance policy cannot be called a capitalist 
because he or she does not have any influence on his or her own investment but is 
entirely dependent on company policies. This is reflected in profit rates. While the 
regular person is happy if his or her savings increase at all, a capitalist aims at a profit 
rate of at least several percent. Furthermore, capitalists finance their livelihood en-
tirely from profits, while savings are usually consumed at some point.
Capitalists lend capital to the rest of the population for a fee. An industrialist, who 
has to take up a credit, uses the capital for his or her own profit but still has to pay 
a fee. Whoever uses real estate, has to pay a rent. Whoever uses money, has to 
pay an interest rate. And everybody has to buy the means of consumption from 
the capitalists. Thereby, almost all investment flows back to the capitalists – ex-
cept savings that is invested for a profit, which is not used up by the investor. One 
might argue that the state apparatus controls up to half of the GDP. But what hap-
pens with that money? The state uses it for social transfers, which are converted 
into means of consumption, for infrastructure, which is constructed by capitalists, 
for interest payments on sovereign debt, for weapons and for civil servants, who 
spend their salaries on means of consumption. Only a segment of the state budget, 
e.g. for education, does not end up fully in the pockets of the capitalists.
Of course, anyone in a democratic society is free to invest capital. Whoever does 
not own any money, can get a credit. But few people do this, since risk is high and 
economic processes are largely unknown. In fact, it is highly unlikely that a com-
plete outsider starts a successful business. Capitalists, in contrast, usually inherit 
not only the invested capital but also the knowledge and the contacts. They do not 
have to acquire or borrow any money and can live off the profits. The remainder of 
the population has to serve the capitalists in order to acquire the means of survival. 
However, there is no logical reason for the capitalists to pay any particular level of 
salaries, it is the result of centuries of struggle.
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The economic class of capitalists comprises not much more than 0.05 percent of 
the world population. In 2015, around 33.7 million individuals in the world (or 
about half a percent) were millionaires in US Dollars (Stierli et alii, 2015: 26). With 
a wealth of one million dollars, you may be a capitalist in a poor country but in 
the global North, where most of the millionaires reside, a million buys you two 
houses, three cars and maybe a boat. All of these are consumer goods, not capital 
investments. You may be able to buy a life-insurance policy and a few stock shares 
but these are controlled by others. The majority of millionaires does not qualify 
as capitalists. It is safe to draw the statistical dividing line between capitalists and 
individuals who own some wealth at around five million US Dollars in the global 
North and at around one million US Dollars in the poorer countries of the global 
South. This leaves us with around 0.07 percent of the world population as potential 
capitalists (Stierli et alii, 2015: 27).
The entire remainder of the world population has to labor or receive transfers in 
order to make a living. Around 14 percent can be classified as an economic middle 
class, while 71 percent of the world population owns wealth of less than 10.000 US 
Dollars (Stierli et alii, 2015: 30). The distance between the laboring class and the 
capitalists can be visualized by equating one million US dollars with one centimeter. 
99.5 percent of the world population would be placed within that one centimeter. 
The average capitalist would be nineteen centimeters away, while the billionaires 
would be more than 1.000 centimeters (ten meters) and up to a hundred meters 
beyond. And the distance is increasing by the day. It has never been as large as 
today (Phillips, 2002: 110).
Finance capitalism
Above, I claimed that capitalism has always been and still is a matter of oligopolies 
and monopolies, that it has nothing to do with a market. This was visible with the 
colonial companies and the great American trusts. The concentration of capital is 
even more extreme today but it is difficult to see. The capitalist economy is run by 
a network of corporations, which are owned by a few transnational corporations 
(TNCs), whose owners are hidden behind a maze of company shares, shell compa-
nies, holding societies and foundations.
An important study by Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder, and Stefano Battiston 
(2011) analyzed the ownership structure of TNCs worldwide. Vitali et alii selected 
the most important TNCs from the Orbis database 2007, which comprised thirty 
million companies. They found that 15,491 TNCs have multiple ties to each other. 
147 TNCs hold forty percent of control of all TNCs and almost fully control one an-
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other (Vitali et alii, 2011: 6). Three quarters of these TNCs are financial institutions 
that hold shares of up to 5,000 other TNCs (Vitali et alii, 2011: 20). It is safe to say 
that the network of these 147 TNCs forms the core of the capitalist economy.
We have to consider that the 200 largest TNCs were responsible of 28.3 percent of 
global GDP in 2000 (Anderson & Cavanagh, 2000). Since the state is responsible for 
up to half of the GDP in some nation states, we can estimate that the network of 
the most powerful 147 TNCs controls up to fifty percent of the global GDP beyond 
the state.
Each TNC holds shares in other TNCs. Especially financial corporations have di-
versified portfolios with shares of less than three percent in a particular compa-
ny. Thereby, each of the powerful TNCs owns a small percentage of every other 
TNC. Company shares are increasingly owned by financial institutions, especially 
investment funds. BlackRock is the biggest and most notorious of them. Banks like 
Merrill Lynch and Barclays, in turn, hold the majority of BlackRock shares. But who 
actually owns the corporations’ capital then? We have to answer the question by 
studying who invests via these funds. BlackRock administers up to seven percent 
of global financial wealth and requires a minimum investment of one million US 
dollars (Dowbor 2017: 106). These are the people who, in the last instance, hold 
the capital of the TNCs. Only the world’s capitalists are potential – and actual – 
customers.
Today’s capitalists no longer own particular companies, which they run on a daily 
basis. Those who build companies from scratch usually sell at least part of them 
after a few years. Capital today is invested via financial institutions that are only 
interested in the profit rate. Each TNC has to generate a certain minimum profit, 
often up to ten percent, in order to attract capital investors. The TNC’s financial de-
partment receives the profit aim from the financial investors and passes down the 
aim to all sub-companies and departments. Quality and price of the products have 
become basically irrelevant. How the profit is generated, does not play any role.
The economic class of capitalists increasingly acts as a block of investors, mediated 
by financial institutions. These might invest the money in productive companies but 
also in speculation, extraction of raw materials, real estate and other processes that 
are, in classical economics, not considered productive. In fact, most of the capital 
does not lead to any economic growth or social wellbeing (Stiglitz 2012: 39). Cap-
italism never pursued this goal. It is more about generating profits for privileged 
self-interested individuals.
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Social classes
However, capitalism is not about money. It is about capital. From this perspective, 
there are only two classes, namely capitalists and laborers (or non-capitalists), as 
Marx has argued. But capital is only a means and capitalist society, in the last in-
stance, is not even about capital but about domination. Therefore, the division of 
society into two economic classes is oversimplifying and misleading. Many mem-
bers of the Rockefeller family are not active as capitalists and some may not even 
have any significant wealth or income. They do not belong to the economic class of 
capitalists. But they are still members of the upper social class. In contrast, a newly 
rich may be a capitalist but will not have access to the upper social class, since he 
or she lacks the contacts, the manners, the knowledge, the family name and the 
respect. A successful football player may have more money than many members of 
the upper social class but he will not become a member of the upper class.
Social class is more fundamental than economic class, since domination is more 
fundamental than capital. A social class is, among other things (see the section 
on definitions), defined by a common tradition, a common culture, almost like an 
ethnic community. The culture is embodied in the habitus (Bourdieu, 1984). Habi-
tus refers to the socially relevant patterns of behavior that are acquired in the life 
course, mostly in childhood. Patterns of behavior are usually acquired in a stable 
social environment and adapted to it. This is often the parental sphere of life; most 
of us learn many important forms of behavior from our parents. Therefore, we have 
a lot in common with people in the social environment of our childhood, typically 
our parents and siblings. The earlier a pattern is acquired, the more stable it tends 
to be. Examples would be the mastery of a musical instrument or the ability to 
play golf, which are usually acquired in childhood and in a typical social environ-
ment. Since the environment does not change significantly all the time, patterns are 
somewhat coherent and stable over time.
A social class is partly defined by a habitus. Its members have similar, albeit not 
identical, patterns of behavior. It is also determined by other factors, such as eco-
nomic capital, labor, education, cultural goods, abilities, manners and language. All 
these factors combine and form a typical combination but any one factor can be 
untypical for any member of the class. A certain member of the Rockefeller family 
may lack university education, another may have no personal wealth and a third 
may be married to a middle-class person – but no member of the family will have 
all of these characteristics. The successful football player may be rich but he has no 
university education and no friends from the upper class – unless he belonged to 
the upper class before becoming a football player.
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Class culture is reproduced from one generation to the next, since habitus and 
institutions cannot be altered at will – they rather form the basis of any alteration. 
It comprises all socially relevant patterns of action. Of course, social class also com-
prises access to economic capital or to labor (or the lack thereof) but habitus and 
social networks are at least equally important. Social class is defined by all socially 
relevant factors that distinguish the classes hierarchically. We can define social class 
as a socio-cultural collective that passes on key elements of habitus and resources 
from one generation to the next and distinguishes itself actively and passively from 
other classes (Jodhka et alii, 2017: 20).
Social class can be operationalized by looking at the limits of social mobility (Jodhka 
et alii, 2017: 20). In order to determine social mobility, we have to take the entire 
life course and the entire family into account. One individual may seem to have 
been socially mobile for a certain period of time – but this is rarely the case over 
the entire lifetime and virtually inexistent for an entire family. A lot of mobility exists 
within a social class but the boundaries of a class are rarely crossed. A university 
student is usually poor but comes (at least) from a middle-class family and usually 
gets (at least) a middle-class job. A poor winner of the lottery may become rich but 
usually loses all of his money before the end of his life. In principle, upward mobil-
ity is possible in a capitalist society, even if it is rare. However, social mobility also 
existed in precapitalist societies. And the patterns are similar. Access to the upper 
class mostly happens through personal networks, especially marriage.
Money and capital are some of the privileges that come with membership in a 
social class. Capital is the most important instrument of preserving hierarchy and 
domination in a capitalist society but it is only one privilege among many. Social 
class is defined by a combination of privileges, all of which amount to domination. 
Domination is the power to influence society and impose one’s will. The hierarchy 
of social classes is a structure of domination.
The upper social class is the dominant class, since it occupies the dominant position 
and is capable of domination. The rest of the population is told that capitalist soci-
ety is about wealth. This makes the structure of domination invisible and forms an 
incentive for people to labor and consume. The acquired wealth mostly ends up in 
the capitalists’ pockets. Most capitalists are members of the dominant class, since 
they inherit economic capital, the relevant social networks and family ties, knowl-
edge about business and a fitting habitus. We are made believe that ownership 
of capital results from competition but this competition starts with the capitalists 
already having capital. The competition for economic capital is basically limited to 
the dominant class.
Revista Sociedade e Estado – Volume 35, Número 3, Setembro/Dezembro 2020 717
The basic structure of a capitalist society consists in a hierarchy of social classes. All 
capitalist nation states have a dominant class and a marginalized class, which is ex-
cluded from access to valued functions in society, e.g. labor. The number and struc-
ture of middle classes varies depending on the history of the nation state as well as 
the timing and nature of the capitalist transformation. The structure of social class-
es is rooted in precapitalist hierarchies or sociocultures, which partly persist for 
generations after the emergence of capitalism and partly shape the social classes.
Inequality and global capitalism
The competition for capital and domination has been mediated by the nation state 
and has thereby partly been confined to it. The nation state is at once the arena for 
the competition between national capitalists and the support structure for transna-
tional expansion. The emergence of institutionalized capitalism was tied to colonial-
ism and, as a consequence, was global from the start. Marxists like Rosa Luxemburg 
(1921: 107) have argued that the generation of surplus entails global expansion as 
a law. This is misleading since no natural law forces human beings to a certain social 
behavior. At the same time, neither capitalists nor members of the dominant class 
form a homogeneous group with one common strategy. They rather compete with 
each other for a better relative position. This is the case on the global level as well 
as on the national level and often even within the family.
Furthermore, the interests of capitalists diverge from those of dominant classes 
and nation states. States are led by politicians who are interested in their careers 
and a strong position of the state. Capitalists are interested in their personal profit. 
Dominant classes wish to preserve their social position. For capitalists residing in a 
globally weak state, a strategy strengthening the state could be negative, for exam-
ple if they profit from development aid, the exploitation of resources or corruption. 
And aggressive profit-seeking could be negative for the dominant class, since it 
leads to instability and rebellion.
Only in the globally dominant state, all of these interests can converge, since they 
all aim at global domination. It is evident that the US replaced Great Britain as the 
globally dominant state in the early twentieth century. Only the American domi-
nant class profits from this position. More than 15 percent of the American pop-
ulation live below the line of poverty (Stiglitz, 2012), and the misery of the British 
working class at the height of British imperial power in the nineteenth century has 
been described in much detail (e.g. Marx, 1985: 477-490). The lower classes of 
Great Britain and the US also had to fight the wars of global expansion and pay with 
their lives to the benefit of the upper classes. Any of the capitalist great powers 
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– from Venice to Florence to Spain to Britain to the US – has been in a constant 
sate of war.
From this, we might want to conclude that the dominant class of the US domi-
nates the world via the US government. This is partly the case, since the interests 
of the dominant class, the government and the capitalists largely converge – in 
global domination and total globalization. However, this hypothesis grossly under-
estimates the competition within the dominant class as well as the differing ideo-
logical and moral ideas of their members. And a conspiracy theory underestimates 
the size of the class, which makes coordinated action virtually impossible. Finally, 
while Great Britain had to compete with Holland, France, Germany and other pow-
ers, the US has to compete with Russia, China and increasingly India. The dominant 
class of the dominant nation state is not the global ruling class.
All other states and their dominant classes are more or less dependent. Any dom-
inant class is largely confined in its power to the respective nation state but more 
so in the dominated states than in the dominant ones. At the same time, capitalists 
have become global. Increasingly, there is only one global capitalist class in eco-
nomic terms, as described above. Capitalists tend toward globalism, while dom-
inant social classes tend toward nationalism – and this conflict often takes place 
within one and the same individual.
Since the unfolding of capitalist colonialism, the dominant class of the dominant 
nation state instrumentalized the state apparatus to improve its global position 
with the aim of global domination. This happened via the accumulation of capital. 
The colonial world was dominated by the colonial powers, especially Great Britain, 
while the colonies were clearly dominated. This was legitimized by racism: the 
dominant were supposed to be biologically or culturally superior. However, each 
nation state developed its internal hierarchy in the wake of colonialism.
The colonial hierarchy was increasingly transformed into a hierarchy of social classes. 
In the colonial center, the feudal socioculture slowly evolved into a class structure, 
while the colonial socioculture in most of the rest of the world persisted in a slightly 
transformed shape after independence, especially in the Americas. The relationship 
between the former colonial center and the rest remained just as unequal as the 
relationship between the former colonial elites and the formerly colonized popu-
lations. Colonialism gave way to dependency and racism to modernization theory.
After the end of the Cold War, an integrated global capitalism began to develop. 
There is a tendency toward one single capitalist class and a tendency toward a 
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single economic system. We are also seeing organizations of global government 
emerging, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund or the World Trade Organization. The structure of the global system resem-
bles the colonial world, since the descendants of the colonial elites form the upper 
classes around the globe and the colonial center mostly remains the center today. 
However, racism and modernization theory have been supplanted by meritocracy, 
while the nation state continues to be the most important unit of social action and 
social hierarchy. Racism and modernization theory correspond to earlier sociocul-
tures of the world: the colonial world into the twentieth century and the world of 
the Cold War until 1989. They shape the current structure and partly persist. But 
they slowly give way to global capitalist society.
The structure of each nation state can be explained by a combination of its history 
and its position in the global capitalist system. We have to interpret the internal 
structure as a transformation of sociocultures. The position in the global system 
is a transformation of the state’s position in the colonial world and the order of 
the Cold War. Furthermore, the timing of the capitalist transformation and political 
measures as well as consequences of revolutions, war, disasters and other major 
events are important parameters in explaining the structures of inequality in detail. 
This goes beyond the scope of this paper (for more details, see Jodhka et alii, 2017).
Conclusion
It is important to understand that capitalism is not a system of natural laws but 
entirely shaped by human beings. It is equally relevant to interpret it as parasitic; 
it feeds off the social economy and the market, from which it has to be clearly 
distinguished. Most important, however, is to view capitalism as a dimension of 
domination. Capital is not an end in itself and the capitalist economy is only the 
surface of capitalist society. Any inequality is about domination, and in capitalism, 
domination is mediated by capital. As a corollary, social class is more fundamental 
than economic class. This is rendered invisible by the focus on money and wealth.
Capitalist society develops a hierarchy of social classes. Class position as well as 
class culture are passed on from one generation to the next. This is rendered in-
visible by the myth of meritocracy, which postulates that any inequality is result 
of a competition on a level playing field. In conjunction with the suggestion that 
competition is about money, the dominated 99.93 percent in capitalist societies 
are pushed to labor for the 0.07 percent – and to, metaphorically speaking, attack 
windmills.
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